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Systems Issues in Airborne Doppler Radar/LIDAR Certification
Questions and Answers
Bruce Mathews (Westinghouse) - I would like to state that Westinghouse wishes to distinguish
that its antenna beam is in no way pointed in an arbitrary fashion. The hazard factor that we
produce and are detecting is for the expected trajectory of the aircraft. We expect that to be
accurate, to some degree, no matter what altitude. I think you have raised many valid points. I
especially like the point that you made about the limitations of simulation for certifying an
airborne radar. Many of the points that you have made about radar cross sections, and the
detection of other small targets in the presence of those kinds of radar cross sections are very
valid. Thirdly, I would like to say, there are other forms besides this wind shear review meeting
where these kinds of systems development issues have been raised including the AIRINC Tag
meetings and the RTCA. To some extent I think what NASA has been doing is raying to shape or
form a skeleton that we can move along, in sort of a road map fashion, toward certification. In
summary though, I think you have made some very good points about certification of airborne
radar.
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FAA Regulatory/System Standards/Certification Status
Questions and Answers
Dave Gollings (FAA) - I would like to put in a little pitch for the pilots. I think we are in pretty
good shape in terms of defining the threat. We are in pretty good shape as far as modeling and
what kind of simulation needs to be done to certify. We are way behind the eight ball in terms of
defining and standardizing the symbology for the display. I don't think the FAA wants to be in the
position of legislating that. We are looking to industry to tell us what kind of symbology they
would like, and will work with you on standardizing'it.
Frank Rock (FAA) - That is a very important point that was just made. Standardization of
displays and symbology, we have that problem almost every time we get a new product coming
on board the airplane. We have gone through it with TCAS and we are looking at it again here
for predictive wind shear.
Randy Avera (FAA) - I would like to encourage everybody to feel free to give us calls at the
FAA when you submit for a supplemental type certificate. A lot of people are intimidated and I
would like to remind you that we are not the IRS. We are people who's job is to help you get
your project approved, and like has been mid here the fewer requirements the better. Some of
our applicants will send in a STC application and that is the last you will ever here from them until
they call up one day and say "hey where is my STC" and we say "where is your data."
Submission of the application, the data, and trips to the ACO's to discuss it face to face has a lot
of credit. People working together solve a lot of problems and you understand things clearer.
We would like to encourage you at your separate ACO's that you are dealing with, to maintain a
good continuous working relationship there. That is going to cut down on the time that it
ultimately takes to get the product in the aircraft and approved.
Frank Rock (FAA) - That reminds me of the guy that came to the ACO and said, "I want my
aircraft certified." And the guy says "where is your data package." He says, "I don't need one I
have the airplane outside." And the guy says "well you have got to have the data so that we know
that it complies with all the regulations." And he said "I don't see why you need to do that, come
on out I will take you for a ride and show you that it does all those nice things."
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Is it possible to start a certification procedure without the
RTCA having completed its business?
A: Frank Rock (FAA) - Tony Broderick reminds us constantly that an applicant has a fight to
certify his equipment with whatever data he presents. It does not have to be from any recognized
group or organization. The RTCA is a committee that has been recognized by us and other
agencies as an advisory group, and is made up of all the interested parties in the aviation
community. We take their input as being one that at least identifies what needs to be done to
equipment onboard the airplane. That is the whole purpose for these men to get together and
donate their time, and the manufacturers pay their salaries. We could walk off and do as we
please, that could happen. At times I have done it, where I disagreed with the SAE or the_,RTCA
committee. I don't like to do that and I don't think that any of the other FAA types like to do it if
at all possible.
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Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - But any manufilcturcr could bring his own technology,
his own methodology and means and that could be accepted?
A: Frank Rock (FAA) - He has a right to do that yes.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley)- I guess my message is that perhaps somebody ought to be
thinking about RTCA's for some of these other technologies. Right now the only one that has
made any real headway, and we are supporting it, is the radar.
Frank Rock (FAA) - The procedure to generate an RTCA committee is that any interested party
could submit a request to what used to be the old executive committee, to consider a technology
to be looked at or form a committee to examine and develop the standards for it. That can be
done by most industry people. The FAA can do it as well.
Q: Jim Evans (MIT) - It was stated that the threat environment specification is largely complete
and in good shape. How has the threat specification for the wind shear phenomena and the clutter
environment been established and where can one obtain a copy of the specification?
A: Kirk Baker ff'AA) - The FAA right now is developing a systems requirements document,
and part of that document includes wind modeling that we are working with NASA to develop.
Those models right now are largely being developed for the wind shear phenomenon itself. One
of those includes a gust front, but largely is focused on microburst. Part of what we have seen
these last two days obviously is going to effect probably some of the ways that we start to look at
those. For example, the flight paths that we have the applicant demonstrate through these
different events. The clutter environment is something that we are probably going to look to
NASA to help us develop. The vendors themselves have been doing quite a lot of work in clutter
mapping and we would expect that they would provide those maps and environments to us and
those would be overlaid in the simulations. There is probably going to be some flight testing
involved also. I think Roland stated earlier that it is going to be a combined mixture of different
types of demonstrations. I encourage the applicants to step forward and make an effort to start
putting together their ideas in how they plan to demonstrate the intended functions of their
systems. We in the FAA can't provide you with a cookbook answer right now and we do not
intend to. We are going to give you some minimum requirements that we think are applicable,
and you are going to have to demonstrate those minimum requirements. We are in the process of
developing those. This is an on going thing so to say we are in good shape, I think we are. I
think we have got some things down in writing and we arc continually working to improve those
and it will continue through the summer ! am sure.
Q: Unknown - Will the FAA be willing to certify a non-universal wind shear detector to meet
the rule mandate? Should this question be answered prior to the vendors producing their
technology?
Roland Bowies (NASA Langley) - As you know, in the airborne side there has been a lot of
focus on the convective microburst kinds of environments as hazardous. In fact you can even see
in the algorithms, features that depend on some sort of stagnation flow with outflows and
estimates of certain mechanical properties in the wind field to help support the alerting structure.
The question is, from the certification point of view, are you willing to certify microburst
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detectorsor ate you going to certify wind shear detectors for whatever the atmospheric
phenomenon is that gives rise to some level of agreed upon energy change that could be
hazardous to the airplane? That is kind of the question.
A: Kirk Baker (FAA) - We are going to do wind shear detection that gives rise to hazardous
energy changes to airplanes.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - How does the industry feel about that? Whose ox does
that gore? Nobodies oxen got gored, so it must be all right. I think that has significant
ramifications with regard to certification.
Jim Evans (MIT) - It seems to me that when you start talking about whether you build physical
understanding about the phenomenon that may cause it versus not, you may adopt a slightly
different principle. That is, if you have an event that possibly looks marginal, if we can decide
what marginal is, that you insist that it have more meteorological characteristics, to rule out the
marginal cases. Let me give an example of that. This came up with the LLWAS system. There
were a lot of problems with the enhanced LLWAS system creating false alerts in gusty Chinook
winds. The problem was, there might be a shear but it was very momentary. In fact, it would not
even be there seven seconds later. There was something there, but it wasn't clear it deserved to
be called a microburst in the sense that it was a very transient phenomenon. The same issue arises
here. You go out and you make a measurement fifteen seconds or thirty seconds in advance and
if the thing goes away under some kind of very transient environmental condition then there is a
question about creating nuisance alerts. So, when you look at something and it looks like a
serious shear, it is a high level shear and it even seems to have some persistence, then maybe I
don't demand that it meet a convective storms criteria. If I have something that just popped up
and it looks kind of marginal, maybe I insist that it at least look like something that is going to
stick around for a while.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - A good example of that is a report floating around the
country concerning the Cafe Pacific 747-400 that got two wind shear alerts going into Singapore.
About 300 miles off shore there was a tropical depression. Reasonable people can look at that
data and question, was that just abnormal structure and turbulent flows being produced by that off
shore depression, or was that a hazardous wind environment? I suspect you could give to five
different competent analyst and get maybe two and a half different answers. The point is that
there are many things in the atmosphere that can give rise to energy change, but the ones that we
clearly must protecl from are the microburst convective downdraft kinds of things. I think the
answer that we heard from Kirk was that you must protect against all atmospheric phenomenon
that will give rise to hazardous energy change to the airplane. Whatever it's atmospheric source,
character or origin. I really thought some of you radar guys out there would say something about
this.
Jim Evans (MIT) - I think we are beginning to repeal rationality. One thing I always hate about
meteorologists is they always talk about extreme events, the most dry, the coldest, the wettest or
whatever. If we are going to talk about all possible atmospheric conditions, I don't understand
what the test program is going to be to deal with all the possible combinations of atmospheric
phenomenon we could ever imagine. You will never test against all that. It is bizarre. In fact it
doesn't make practical sense. If you are willing to accept that adequate protection is provided by
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areactivesystemthatdoesn'tprovide any reactive output on takeoff until you have gotten to at
least 50 feet in altitude, I would argue that there is a fraction of events that are potentially
hazardous that it is not going to protect you against. And, if you are willing to buy that, why do
you then want to turn around and require protection against everything when you have already
stated it is safe below 50 feet. I think you are repealing rationality. You have to make some
value judgments and stick by them.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Don't accuse me of being a meteorologist. I think this is a
fairly important question. One of these days ,somebody is going to walk into an ACO office and
say, "Look what I got, This microburst detector is the best thing since sliced bread." and they are
going to say, "So what. What about the other nine or ten test cases that you must protect the
airplane against." It gets at the heart of the certification procedure. Are we going todo it? Are
we going to have the target generator concept that the RTCA is looking at? Are we going to
have gust fronts in there, off shore strong sea breezes, Chinook winds, thunder storms and all
those embedded. I do not think the industry can "afford that target generator to plug your radar
into to show a minimum operating performance standard. Are we going to do it in simulation?
Who in the country is building the database which will be qualified to subject the various
instrumentation capabilities to, for detection performance, rejection of certain characteristics that
are not considered hazardous, etc. This is where we are on the airborne side. How do you test
the adequacy of a system? By what means do we do this? Who says that these databases are
qualified for these uses? Or, do you get .some good old boys from the industry together and they
write a MOP because they all think they can meet it? I think .some of you understand that
problem.
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